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NOTES ON VOLITION.
By Prof. A. BAIN.
The nature of Will involves several distinct questions admit-
ting of separate treatment, and not necessarily controlling each
other. The motives to voluntary action are unquestionably
summed up in Pleasure and Pain, and, therefore, involve a certain
amount of inquiry into the bearings of both these states. An
exhaustive discussion of pleasurable aud painful feelings is not
needed in connexion with Volition ; we may confine ourselves to
an induction of the facts of feeling-prompted action, from which
we can draw our inferences upon the doubtful matters at issue.
The ground may be fairly covered by these three questions:—
I. Assuming for the present that the motives to the will, in its
normal character, are comprehended under pleasure and pain, the
question arises whether the motive power of each is a distinct
fact, although somehow correlated to the other, or whether both
can be resolved into one, viewed as double-sided—in other
words, positive and negative.
II. How far is the fixed idea to be considered the true type of
voluntary action ? This would suppose that pleasure and pain,
which of course cannot be denied as motives, operate mediately,
that is through impressing an idea, to be followed by the
corresponding actuality.
III. The relation of the will to disinterested action would have
to be considered as an offshoot of the foregoing problem.
I will begin with a few observations on the second question.
Let us then first see what is the most comprehensive and
prevalent usage in speaking of the voluntary motives. Now,
it is plain at a glance that such usage points to pleasure
and pain as the main arbiters of human conduct. This does
not settle the dispute as to whether their operation is mediate
or immediate. Some distinct criterion must be found to show
men's habitual leanings in this respect. It requires to be
seen whether popular forms of speech really take cognisance
of the fixed idea in its own distinctive character, putting it
forward as a standing instrumentality of conduct whether
moved by pleasure and pain or in any other way. In point
of fact, there are other ways, more or less prominent, of
bringing the fixed idea into exercise. The mere intensity of an
idea, as caused by a vivid sensation, would give it a hold, in con-
sequence of which it would tend to act itself out, and to exclude
other ideas even supposing these had the aid of a certain amount
of the hedonic quality. Now, does the popular mind distinctly
recognise the fact, that a pleasure, in order to move us, must
work by stamping or strengthening the hold of an idea ? It
would be difficult to put this in evidence with any degree of
certainty. Indeed, so universal and preponderating is the action
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254 A. BAIN:
of pleasure and pain that the likelihood is in favour of immediate
agency; inasmuch as cases must be frequent where the mediate
link is somehow or other tampered with. The general expecta-
tion is that when we supply, as a motive, a certain force of
pleasure or pain, we can count upon the result as a matter of
course. The proposal to treat the fixed idea as the essential
antecedent of voluntary action is, on the face of it, at variance
with our reading of the usual course of human action.
That particular aspect of the will shown in the fact that the
guiding influence of our sensibility to pain or pleasure is an in-
fluence from moment to moment altogether instantaneous in its
working, is evidently best represented by the doctrine of immediacy
of operation. It is difficult to interpose an idea at each step of the
supposed agency. There is no apparent advantage in making the
supposition. The only question of any magnitude that gains by it,
is the question of altruism of conduct, which, however, is a
phenomenon entirely additional and apart. I t is the question of
our sympathy and sociability, and cannot be fully disposed of in
the elementary analysis of will. •
The immediate operation of pleasure and pain upon the will
receives decisive confirmation when we study the lowest forms of
life, and the initial stages of the higher forms. The processes of
the understanding in regard to ideas are, in these instances,
necessarily inchoate or imperfect, and their imperfection would be
felt in crippling the voluntary activity, supposing it depended on
ideas. Yet there is no sign of such crippling; indeed, the con-
servation of life would be very precarious if the action of the will
were not promptly shown under present pleasure or pain, and
more especially pain.
To recur now to the first question—viz., the dispute as to
whether pain is to be regarded as the sole motive in voluntary
action. In contending for the affirmative, it is very proper to re-
mark that pleasure disposes us directly and mediately and under
all circumstances to quiescence; which quiescence is disturbed
only by some form of uneasiness, i.e., pain.
Even under this view of the matter, a distinction would have to
be made between two forms of pain—viz., the pain of positive
hurt or infliction, as in the irritation of some of our sense-organs,,
and the pain of suspension, intermission, or privation, of some
pleasure. These two things are never confounded; and the
usages of mankind have developed them into a wide-ranging-
series of distinctions. There is, of course, as in so many instances,
a doubtful margin, where we cannot exactly say whether a state
of pain is pure infliction or pure privation. The mere fact of our
being accustomed to an indulgence admittedly occasions pain,
when we are deprived of it. Yet, before this state is reached, the
motive power of pleasure to instigate action, and not mere
quiescence, would have to be interpreted as an influence of
pleasure in its proper character.
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NOTES ON VOLITION. 255
When we encounter a pleasure and are aware that an exertion
on our part would suffice to increase it, do we or do we not
remain still ? And if we do not remain still, what is the precise
character of the motive at work ? If expressed by pain, it is that
very peculiar form of pain that shows us that being well we have
it in our power to become better. This may indeed be called pain,
but it has very little in common with the pain of pure infliction.
It is notorious that the state called ' appetite' brings into
play both extremes without confusing them together, indeed,
language is most decisive in upholding their separate character
notwithstanding their concurrence. The names punishTnent and
reward are supposed to mean a real distinction of motive, explain
it as we please.
In dealing with the supposed efficacy of pleasure in making us
quiescent, instead of active, our difficulty always is to allow for
the dread of overdoing the pursuit of pleasure and running upon
the point of some pain. It is a matter of temperament to be
more or less alive to this peculiar caution, and, where the
temperament is wanting or deficient, we see the motive power of
pleasure begun in its most rampant form—a form that belies the
supposition of an intrinsic efficacy of pleasure to subdue, instead
of stimulating, activity. The constant reproach brought against
human beings is their over-pursuit of pleasure and their too
little avoidance of pain, even the pains of positive infliction..
The analysis of psychology would run in the teeth of inveterate
usage, if it were to resolve all the power of pleasure into pain
strictly so-called.
There still remains the study of the situations where either
pleasure or pain, instead of being a fixed quantity (the assumption
underlying the previous' remarks), is supposed to be steadily
increasing or steadily diminishing.
Let us suppose a pain diminishing under some movement
concurring at the time, and presumably the source of alleviation.
Taken on the whole, or as a general case, this is probably the
most stimulating of all the situations. The primary motive
power arising from the painful uneasiness is augmented in a
remarkable degree. In fact, what might be the quiescence of
despair under pain is here removed and an element is introduced
whose potency is expressed in a great variety of terms, showing
the current appreciation of its force. It is the sense of relief,
encouragement, hope ; it is called a mental tonic, which operates
when everything else fails. It maybe advantageouslyillustrated by
comparison with the case of introducing an alien pleasure such as
at best could assist us to endure the pain but would not be a
powerful stimulus to action, unless indeed on the supposition
that pleasure operates independently. If the standpoint of unity
of motive were to be preferred, the influence of lessening pain
would be the most favourable supposition; at all events, it would
be found to be the most efficacious of all the stimulants to activity.
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256 A. BAIN :
Here, however, comes in the collateral tendency of pain to
reduce vital energy in general, and motor activity in particular.
For, testing fairly the play of motives, we must assume the
system to be in an average equipment for any required exertion.
It must not, on the one hand, be depressed or exhausted, so as to
be beyond the spur of pain, nor, on the other hand, so exuberant
as to be on the outlook for a pretext or an occasion for expending
its wealth. Under an ordinary or viean condition, a pain or un-
easiness would undoubtedly act as a stimulus, and that in propor-
tion to its intensity or degree. Activity would be instigated and
would continue so long as the pain continued and energy was
f orthcoining. The final upshot would appear as one of three alterna-
tives. (1) The action might simply have no effect in the way of alle-
viation. Nevertheless, if both the pain and the strength continued,
action of some kind would go on until one of the other alterna-
tives arose. (2) It might be felt that the pain was increasing;
whereupon, if the increase seemed to be strictly concomitant with
the movements so as to appear cause and effect, there would be
a decisive prompting to stop. (3) The movement instigated
might consciously alleviate the pain, and the consequent stimulus
would be to continue it, or even to increase its amount. Now, of
these last two cases, which is the more potent motive, on the
supposition of an average or normal example of each ? We put
aside the case of failure of active power through the growing
pain, so as to obtain an absolutely fair comparison. The decision
lies between the energy of the stimulus to stop when pain is
increasing or to go on with increase when pain is diminishing.
Both are unquestioned and energetic motives, yet, possibly, they
may be too near equality to admit of a perfectly exact estimate
as to relative strength.
Recurring to the observation that relief from pain operates as
a decided mental tonic, we are thrown into a nice computation
of the bearing of the circumstance on the increase of vitality as
6hown in executive power. There is, however, something common
to the two previous suppositions—namely, the fact that the
stoppage of the movement that is increasing the pain leads to a
stoppage of that increase, resembles the abatement supposed in
the alternative situation. Still, to be arrested at the point of not
adding to the pain is evidently an inferior condition, as compared
with continuing a movement that is reducing the original amount.
Whatever may be the result of analysis in its highest subtlety,
this last situation is popularly accounted the superior in point of
motive energy. The only ground for not deciding absolutely in
its favour is the remark already made as to the increase of active
efficiency apart from strict motive power.
Whether or not the situation of relief from a felt pain by
concurring movement is the most absolutely potent variety of
voluntary motive, the question may still be put—Is it the funda-
mental or all-embracing type of voluntary action, into which the
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NOTE8 ON VOLITION. 257
other types may be resolved, being thereby made out to be
derivatives ? Before answering, we must view the two remaining
situations—viz., a growing pleasure and a diminishing pleasure.
To do justice to these two forms of motive, we must assume
that we start from a state of quiescent indifference and full
contentment Any state of contentment or indifference, although
free from motive power as such, would not remain unaffected by
an access of pleasure supervening. Of course, on the supposition
that pleasure tends to quiescence, we might simply appropriate
the addition to our enjoyment, and do nothing to obtain a further
increase. We might, so to speak, take what comes and be
satisfied, and repeat the same attitude with every new access or
increase—like Macbeth, in his feebler mood, when he seemed to
be shrinking back from the murder, leaving it to the fate that
predicted his being king to make him so. . As already remarked,
this is no doubt a possible situation, occasionally realised; but it
is always open to the suspicion of an underlying motive of caution
against risks. What it would be, if there were absolutely no
dread of throwing away an actual good to secure a possible
increase, it is extremely difficult for us to decide; we can only
proceed by the method of concomitant variations, which, as
already seen, shows us how ardent is the pursuit of pleasure in
the incautious temperaments. Moreover, when the supposed
increase is something considerable, we are apt to be thrown off
our balance of precaution, and then the ardour of pursuit would
appear to manifest itself in purity, and so attest its magnitude
as a motive. Still, the influence of the tonic already
mentioned is to be counted for such a case; yet not without
qualification, seeing that the pleasure may be of the nature of
stimulation at the cost of vital energy or increased power.
There remains now the concluding alternative, the obverse of
the foregoing—viz., a diminishing pleasure in concurrence with
some form of active exertion. Doubtless, if the pleasure were
an element in our state of contentment, or a conditio sine qud
non of our quiescence, then its loss would scarcely differ from a
case of painful infliction, or, at least, it would be an example of
the doubtful margin.
It is impossible to discuss this thesis in all its extent without
becoming aware of the (jreat differences among pleasures them-
selves, differences that might be conceived to have no bearing upon
the theory of Will, but that in all probability have a very serious
bearing. The pleasures of Sense, strictly so-called, have probably
a common character as regards will; but, when we pass to Emo-
tion, we find very important peculiarities. Take, for example, the
group of emotions including power, victory, revenge and malignity
—in short, the whole cycle of the situations connected with the
fighting impulse. We find it very difficult to adapt these to the
view that the stimulus of the will is uneasiness pure and simple,
and that pleasure, as such, leads to quiescence and contentment.
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258 A. BAIN : NOTES ON VOLITION.
To say the least of it, a very great strain must be pnt upon the facts
to establish such a position. The possession of power, the gain-
ing of victories, the tasting of malignant gratification, notoriously
urge us to seek for more. The case of Alexander is tvpical of the
whole range of human experience in this field. If there were a
tendency to quiescence under the spur of a great victory, or the
attainment of a position of influence, why should we be urged on,
even at the expense, of labour and endurance, to gain some
higher eminence ? Why does ambition know no bounds ? why
does it despise the cost of sacrifices ?
Even the amicable emotions, whose nature it is rather to be
calm and quiescent, instead of yielding the fury of restless excite-
ment, are not free from the urgency to seek their own increase.
Provided only that they give a nigh amount of pleasure with the
prospect or possibility of more, they operate as motives to pursuit.
What may be said in the way of distinguishing these from the
foregoing is, that the fighting circle of emotions are imbedded in a
greater degree of active stimulus than the amicable circle. Yet,
experience proves that the energy of pursuit may be as high in
the region of the amicable as in any class of feelings whatsoever.
That a taste of pleasure constitutes an impetus to seek for
more may be accepted as the normal situation of the human will.
If it were within the power of analysis to resolve it into the
stimulus of pain or uneasiness, it would still, under the guise of
a derivative fact, be recognised as a special mode or outgoing of
voluntary motive. The case of an actual pain, in the form of
injury or infliction, would always be regarded as distinct from the
uneasiness of being held back, under a condition of integrity in
all our senses and susceptibilities, from adding a second dose of
positive pleasure actually imparted. When, in the theatre, the
audience are shouting for an encore, it would seem, to put it
mildly, a very bold supposition to represent them as in a state
of pain. It is needless to repeat that such pain as may belong
to the case is a species by itself, having pleasure as its founda-
tion, and, but for the pleasure, the motive to the will would suffer
collapse.
The graded scale of voluntary action may be said to range from
the lowest depths of pain to the highest assignable or attainable
modes of pleasure. From the very nature of things, the motive
power must be at its maximum at the lower end. Pain is neces-
sarily the prompting influence up to the point of neutrality or
indifference, at which point the battle is more than half won. In
going higher, there is a conflict of forces; the motive strength
already diminished will be subject to still further diminution, and
only a situation of growing pleasure, and that in a high degree,
can furnish an efficient stimulus. Under any circumstances,
motive power must die away as the upper end of the scale comes
nearer.
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